University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series
Volume 35 March 1927

Article 3

1927

Jurisdiction to Divorce
James L. Parks

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James L. Parks, Jurisdiction to Divorce, 35 Bulletin Law Series. (1927)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls/vol35/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

JURISDICTION TO DIVORCE
It is generally conceded by American authority that a divorce granted by a court, when neither party to the marriage is domiciled within its

jurisdiction, is invalid, and this is the rule even though the defendant
submits himself to the court's action.' This proposition is said necessarily
to result "from the right of every nation or state to determine the status

of its own domiciled citizens or subjects, without interference by [other]
tribunals in a matter in which they have no concern."2 So long as the
parties have a common domicile, the matter of jurisdiction to divorce is

one of no difficulty, but often parties are not living together, and either
the husband or the wife attempts to get a divorce at his or her place of
settlement without securing personal jurisdiction of the defendant.
Courts have been granting divorces in such instances, upon constructive
service of the defendant, in actions that are practically ex parte. Are such
decrees valid? Are they based upon due process so that they must be

accredited in a sister state under the federal Constitution. 3
There is no question but that in a variety of cases states, through

their courts upon constructive service of process, have affected in one
way or another existing relations and rights without personal jurisdiction
of interested parties. In all so-called actions in rem, or quasi in rem, as

they are established and recognized, it is considered due process for a
court to affect such relations and rights, because it is deemed to be es-

sential for a sovcreign to have this power for the orderly regulation of its
domestic affairs. 4 Perhaps the best illustration of the exercise of such
power is the attachment of property, situated within ajurisdiction, where
the owner thereof is absent.
1. Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U.S. 14,23 Sup. Ct. 237,47 L. Ed. 366; see,
also, Wagoner v. Wagoner (1920) 287 Mo. 567, 229 S. W. 1064; Bechtel v. Bechtel
(1907) 101 Minn. 511, 112 N. IV. 883, 12 L. A. R. (N.S.) 1100 and note; note (1925)
39 A. L. R. 677.
2. Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87, 93.
3. Art. 4, sec. 1.
4. "...probably not a day passes in which things within their U. e. courts'l
jurisdiction are not, by direct attachment or garnishee proceedings, seised, attached,
condemned, and sold under their judgments, without other than constructive notice
to the non-resident owners of them, in order that these courts may do justice to their
own citizens,'or even to alien friends, properly applying for their relief. Here, too,
necessity requires the courts to dispense with personal notice, in order to give effect
to their judicial orders, since otherwise, the state might be full of the property of nonresidents and aliens, applicable to all purposes except the commandingonesofjustice."
Ditson v. Ditson, supra, note 2, 4 R. I. 1. c. 100. See, also, Dillon v. Heller (1888) 39
Kan. 599. "All states, by proper statutes, authorize actions against non-residents,
and service of summons therein by publication only, or service in some other form no
bEtter; and in the nature of things such must be done in every jurisdiction, in order
that full and complete justice may be done." id. 603.
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Of course, what a court does in an attachment proceeding is to destroy the owner's "bundle" of rights, powers, privileges and immunities
commonly called title.5 Without thLt owner ever having been personally
subject to the jurisdiction of the court so acting, he is deprived of all
legal power over the property, and of all privileges to enjoy the same.
Now such action by a court cannot accurately be described as merely
affecting a res, or inanimate mass, which is before it. In truth, the court
does nothing to the res as such. The effective part of the judgment is
that which deprives the owner of the legal power to assert dominion
over the res. In other words, thejudgment destroys a relation, or dissolves
a slatus.

a

Again, take the garnishment case where A, in State 1, sues B to re.
cover money due from B to C in order that C's obligation to A may thus
be satisfied. It has been held that A may do this, upon constructive
service of C, when C is not within 1, and has never come personally under
thejurisdiction of 1's court.' Here clearly there is no res before the court.
All that I's court does in such a case is to destroy a relation. It finally
and conclusively deprives C of a right against B, and absolves B from
further duties and obligations to C.

5. Green v. Van Buskirk (1866) 5 Wall. (U. S.) 307, 18 L. Ed. 599, 7 Wall. 139,
19 L. Ed. 109; Melhop v. Doane (1871) 31 Iowa 397, 7 Am. Rep. 147. See, also, Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Castrique v. Tomlinson (1870) L. R.
4 H. L. 414; Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) sec. 1378.
Sa. Probably, originally, courts thought of proceedings in rem as being directed
against property alone, and as merely affecting a res within the jurisdiction. But at
this day it would seem obvious that courts are not interested in "the spatial quality
of property" (Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts, 119181 31 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 907).
The justification for a court's interfering in this type of case is the necessity of controlling and regulating a situation necessarily subject to its jurisdiction. If a situation of
a like natur~e exists, which is unconnected with tangible property, a like jurisdiction
should also exist. "All proceedinks, like all rights, are really against persons." Holmes,
C. J. in Tyler v. Court (1900) 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N. E. 812. See, also, Pennoyer v.
Neff, supra, note 5, 95 U. S. 1. c. 734.
6. Harris v. Balk (1905) 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. Ed. 1023; see
notes L.R.A. 1915F 880; Ann. Cas. 1918C. 829. For a criticism of the rule in Harris v.
Balk, see Beale, Exercise ofJurisdiction in Rem, (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107; compare
Carpenter, supra note 5a, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 905. Professor Beale in Haddock Revisited
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417,425 suggests that the whole basis ofjurisdiction should be
consent, and says that "since the decision in Harris v: Balk, the creditor submits his
interest in the chose in action to any state into which the debtor may choose to go."
Sed qu? It is believed that any such consent as that suggested by Professor Beale is
altogether fictitious. Surely a decision by the federal Supreme Court (at least, if unknown to the creditor) could not affect his state of mind, and create a willingness on
his part to submit his power to sue the garnishee to the jurisdiction of any state where
the latter's whim might carry him. It is believed that the power of a court in a garnishment case to destroy the creditor's chose in action is to be justified, as in all cases
in rem or quasi in rem because a state must have such jurisdiction for the orderly
regulation of domestic affairs. It is no more an abuse of power to cut off the absent
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A judgment in rem then may be described as one which, without
personal jurisdiction of a party, often modifies or destroys his rights,
powers, privileges and immunities with respect to a certain ielation or
status. If a sovereign state has a sufficient interest in the relation or status,
which it seeks to affect, or change, its court's judicial decree in this direction should be sustained.
Certainly, a state is vitally interested in the marriage relation of its
domiciled citizens. It would seem, therefore, that upon sound analogy
its courts, predicating their power to act upon such interest, may enter
a decree, upon the petition of one of its domiciled citizens, terminating
such citizens' marriage for a cause which it deems sufficient. Such a
decree should not be regarded as differing in a substantial way, or in
principle from the ordinary decree in rem. Further than this, it might
well be said that the fact that the defcndant-spouse, affected by such a
decree, was without and not subject to the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's
domiciliary court should not deprive it of the power to end the marriage.
If the marriage could be made tangible, we could say, as in all proceedings
in ren, that the domestic relation is before the court, and, because of the
sovereign's interest therein, the court can terminate the same, and, as in
all other like cases, by so doing, destroy the powers and rights of the
7
absent defendant.
A possible objection to the above suggestions might be that the
domicil of the absent defendant-spouse has a like interest in the marriage
relation of the parties and that, for this reason, the plaintiff's domiciliary
courts cannot conclusively settle the matter, and thereby oust the former's courts of their jurisdiction over the marriage. It must be conceded
creditor's power to sue and collect the debt, without personal jurisdiction of him,
than it is to cut off the absent owner's power of enjoyment of tangible personal property in an attachment proceeding. See Corbett v. Littlefield (1890) 84 Mich. 30, 47
N. W. 581. Smolik v. P. & R. Coal and Iron Co. (1915) 222 Fed. 148, 151, contains a
valuable discussion of the question of when jurisdiction by consent exists over a
defendant.
7. Ellison v. Martin (1873) 53 Mo. 575; Gould v. Crow (1874) 57 Mo. 200;
Anthony v. Rice (1892) 110 Mo. 223, 19 S. IV. 423; McDermott v. Gray (1906) 198
Mo. 266, 95 S. W.431; Lieber v. Lieber (1911) 239 Mo. 1, 143 S. %N.
458; Williams v.
Williams (1893) 53 Mo. App. 617; Hamillv. Talbott (1899) 81 Mo. App.210 (dictum);
Stone v. Stone (1908) 113 S. W. (Mo. App.) 1157. "A divorce suit is a proceeding in
rem. The status of husband arid wife is the res to be acted upon and dissolved by the
decree ...... This status or relation attaches to each party, and goes with each to
their respective domiciles if they happen to have separate domiciles .... Every State
or sovereign has the right to determine the domestic relations of all persons having
their domicile within its territory; and, therefore, where a husband or wife is domiciled
within a particular State, the courts of that State can take jurisdiction over the
status, and for proper causes act on this rem, and .... such decrees are entitled to full
faith and credit in all the States and Territories." Gould v. Crow, supra, 57 Mo. 1.c.
203 et seq. See, also, (accord) Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87, the leading case for
theview advocated. Compare Burge v. Burge (1902) 94 Mo. App. 15, 67 S. W. 703.
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* that the defendant's domicil's courts have a similar interest and consequently a like power to divorce the parties. At the same time, it should
be noted that this jurisdiction is over the same identical and indivisible
relation; a "husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law." s Each domicil is interested in one and the same marriage. It is, therefore, a case where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter. Under such circumstances it is
proper to hold that the court first to take the matter in hand by so doing
excludes the other from the power to act.9 It is believed that the positions
suggested can be taken, consistently with established principles, and
jurisdiction to divorce placed upon a workable basis. It is now proposed
to examine the actual decisions, and to determine to what extent they
are in accord with the advocated theory.
I
Suppose that Husband and Wife are living together, domiciled in
State 1; that Wife leaves Husband and goes to State 2, where she establishes herself with such an intent as would, were she under no legal disability, constitute 2 her domicil; that after Wife's departure, Husband
brings a divorce action upon constructive service in 1, where he has continued domiciled without gaining personal jurisdiction over Wife.
Should the divorce be granted, conct.ding that it should not be, if it will
not be based upon such due process as to entitle it to full faith and credit
under the federal Constitution in all the States of the Union?
8. Gray, J.,in Atherton v. Atherton (1900) 181 U. S.155, 162, 21 Sup. Ct. 544,
45 L. Ed. 794.
9. See quotation from Gould v. Crow, supra, note 7. "If one sovereign has power
to decree a divorce to its own inhabitant, the other has the same power as a necessary
incident of its sovereignty. From the very nature of the case, there can be no such
thing as a dissolution of the marriage as to one spouse and a preservation of it as to
the other. One cannot be deemed married and the other unmarried. It is the union
of the two spouses that constitutes the status. When the union is made twain by a
divorce in one state, the status has lost one of its essential supports, and necessarily
falls." Miller v. Miller (1925) 206 N. W. (Iowa) 262, 264. "The conclusion of the
argument is that, the courts of New York (i. e. of the wife's domicill having the same
power to decree a dissolution of the marriage at the suit of the wife, that the courts of
Connecticut Ii. e. of the husband's domicill would have to make a similar decree at
the suit of the husband, it would become a mere race of diligence between the parties
in seeking different forums in other States; or the celerity by which in such States
judgments of divorce might be procured, would have to be considered in order to decide which forum was controlling. Granting this to be the case, does not every plea of
res adjudicata presuppose a prior judgment, and is it a defense to such a plea that
such judgment was obtained by superiority in a race of diligence? The whole doctrine
is founded, if not upon the doctrine of superior diligence, at least upon the theory of a
prior judgment, which fixes irrevocably the rights of the parties, whenever and wherever these rights may come in question." Brown, J., dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock (1905) 201 U. S.562, 616 elseq., 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867.
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If a divorce action is one solely in rem, a decree granted the husband
in the assumed case in I would be valid and would have to be credited in
all the States of the Union under the federal Constitution. As already
suggested. we would not have to concern ourselves with the matter of
the absent wife's domicil, or the question of l's court's personal jurisdiction over her. While the marriage relation might well be under the control of the wife's domiciliary court, it would be equally under that of
l's court. l's court, by first taking jurisdiction, and granting the
divorce, would dissolve the whole of the marriage, destroy the
wife's powers, privileges and immunities as such, and preclude her and
all courts from thereafter interfering with or questioning l's decree. To
take this position in regard to l's judgment would be merely giving it
the attributes required to be given to any decree in rein, and would be
entirely proper.
On the other hand, if a divorce decree is to be characterized as one
in personam, the validity of a decree granted the husband in 1, without
i's court having personal jurisdiction of the wife, gained by having
served her with process in 1, would be very questionable. If a wife is free
to acquire a separate domicil, apart from her husband, whether he has
given her cause to leave him or not, it is certain that the decree of l's
court, under the assumed facts, would not be based upon due process

and would not be binding outside of 1. Indeed, it seems that it should
not be binding within 1.50 That court had not actually gained jurisdiction
of the wife's person, and, as she was not a domiciled citizen of 1, it had
no inherent personal jurisdiction over her so as to bind her by substituted
service."'

The rule generally recognized is that a married woman is not free
to gain a separate domicile unless she, because of her hlisband's violation of his marital duties, is privileged to be living apart from him. This
10. "If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte
against non-resident and absent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in
the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested, could be
upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and oppression." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 5, 95 U.S. 1.c. 726. See, also, Beale, Constitutional
Protection of Decrees, (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 586, 594.
11. It has been held that a citizen of a state is "upon principles of international
right, subject to the laws, and the jurisdiction of the courts of that state" without personal service of process upon him within the boundaries of such sovereign. Henderson
v. Stamford (1870) 105 Mass. 504, 505; Bimeler v. Dawson (1843) 5 II. 536, 39 Am.
Dec. 430; Sturgis v. Fay (1861) 16 Ind. 429, 79 Am. Dec. 440. See, also, Scott. Fundamentals of Procedure (1922) 41. While the rule as stated is generally conceded, there
is a difference of opinion as to what kind of notice such a judgment must be predicated upon. See Raher v. Raher (1911) 129 N. NA.(Iowa) 494, 35 L
. A. (N. S.) 292
and note; Scott op. cit. 41 et seq. note 25.
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principle is based upon a fiction, it being said that whenever it is the duty
of a wife to be with her husband, she will be taken as being constructively
domiciled with him, and will not be heard to assert the contrary. 2 If
this rule of law is accepted, and made controlling in the assumed case,
l's court could have granted the husband a divorce, which would have
been conclusive in all other states, if it was the fact that the wife was
away from her husband withoutjustifiable cause. Under such conditions,
the wife would have been constructively domiciled with her husband,
and thus subject to the latter's domiciliary court's personal jurisdiction
without gervice of that court's process upon her within its domain. On
the other hand, if the fact was that the wife was under no duty to be with
her husband, she could not be considered domiciled with him, and, upon
principles already discussed, the decree of l's court would not bind her
personally.
It should be noted also that, if the theory of a divorce action is that
it is in personam and if the further proposition is that a wife is domiciled
with her husband unless she is free, consistently with her wifely duties,
to leave him, l's court, if it were to grant the husband a divorce, could
not finally settle the matter. Suppose that l's court, proceeding in conformity with the suggested propositions, should decide that the wife was
a deserter, and consequently domiciled constructively with her husband,
and granted a divorce upon that basis; its findings to this effect would
be as to jurisdictional facts, and facts of this nature may be inquired into
whenever the validity of a judgment based thereon is called into question. 13 It follows inevitably, therefore, that whenever l's decree affected
the wife's rights before the tribunal of another state, she would be free
to raise the question of l's court's jurisdiction over her, and if the other
state's court found that she was privileged to leave her husband, and had
not been delinquent in going to another state and establishing a domicil
there, l's decree could be discredited and the divorce held invalid. It is
believed, however, that this finding could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, because, if l's court's finding as to the wife's
12. Loker v. Gerald (1892) 157 Mass. 42, 31 N.E. 709; Prater v. Pratcr (1888)
87 Tenn. 78. See Ware v. Flory (1917) 199 Mo. App. 60, 201 S. W. 593; Beale, Tile

Domicile of a Married Woman (19171 2 South L. Quart. 93; Parks, The Domicile of a
Married Woman (1923) 29 L. Ser. Univ.'of Mo. Bul. 14; note (192'5) 39 A. L. R. 710.
13. Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 21 1. Ed. 897; Hall v.
Lanning (1875) 91 U.S. 160, 23 L. Ed. 271; Fisher v. Fielding (1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34
A. 714. Compare Howeyv. Howey (1922) 240 S. W. (Mo) 450 where it is said that a
judgment may not be collaterally attacked for want of jurisdiction. "... . if the judgment is to be attacked for infirmities not apparent upon the face of the record, then
it must be reached by some direct action." Graves, J. ibid 456. But this is not the
generally prevailing rule when it comes to the validity of a foreign judgment under tile
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution. See Haddock v. Haddock
(1906) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867.
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guilt was correct, its divorce was entitled to full faith and credit under the
federal Constitution. But, short of such a finding by the federal Court,
the court of any sister state would not be bound to respect l's decree,
but could examine the jurisdictional fact anew, and if it believed that the
wife was not guilty in leaving her husband and withdrawing from 1, and
l's court's power, it could with impunity disregard l's decree.
The New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the
United States had the question raised by the assumed case before them
in A4therton v. ltherton.14 In that case the husband brought suit for divorce in Kentucky, his domicil itthat time and the parties' last and only
matrimonial domicil,"5 after his wife had left him and established her
home in New York. The Kentucky statute provided that "petitions for
divorce must be brought in the county where the wife usually resides, if
she has an actual residence in the state; if not, then in the county of the
husband's residence ...."6 Pursuant to this statute, the action had
been brought in the county of the husband's domicil, service being made
upon the wife by publication only. After the husband had commenced
his divorce action in Kentucky, and while it was pending, his wife sued
him in New York, which she claimed as her domicil, for divorce on the
grounds of cruel treatment. Before the New York action came on for
trial, the Kentucky court granted the husband a divorce because it found
that his wife had deserted him, and he, having appeared in the New York
action, pleaded the Kentucky decree and claimed that that judgment
bound the wife, conclusively settling the matter in litigation. The New
York Court, however, refused to accredit the Kentucky decree, and
granted the wife a divorce as prayed for.
The New York Court held that the Kentucky Court did not have
jurisdiction of the wife and, therefore, its decree did not have to be recognized under the Constitution. The Court apparently regarded a divorce action as one in personan17 and stated that, as the wife was rightfully away from her husband, she was not domiciled in Kentucky and,
for this reason, was not bound by the Kentucky Court's decree unless
served with process within that State.18 The husband appealed from
this judgment to the federal Supreme Court and secured a reversal,
14. (1898) 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933; (1900) 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544,
45 L. Ed. 794.
15. By matrimonial domicil is meant a place where the parties were living together domiciled as man and wife.
16. 181 U.S. 1.c. 160.
17. 155 N. Y. 1.c. 133.
18. "The New York Court... found that she was justified by her husband's
acts in leaving his home and in acquiring a new domicil for herself, and that the Kentucky court therefore obtained no jurisdiction over her." Peckham, J. dissenting in
Atherton v. Atherton, supra note 14, 181 U. S. 1.c. 174.
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that Court requiring the New York Court to accredit the Kentucky
decree and dismiss the wife's action. The opinion of the learned Court
possibly is not as clear as might be desired, and it appears to be a matter
of some speculation as to what were the exact grounds upon which the
New York decree was reversed. 19 It is certain, though, that the Supreme
Court thought that the Kentucky Court had the legal power to grant the
husband a divorce, which would bind the absent wife under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause everywhere in the United States.
The court laid down the broad propositions that the "purpose and
effect of a decree of divorce .... by a court of competent jurisdiction, are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both. . ." That "the marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party," ceased "to bind either." That "a husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.""0 That the
rule "as to the notice necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce
is different from that which is required in suits in personam."21 That a
decree of divorce does not fall "within the rule that a judgment rendered
against one not within the state, or amendable [amenable?] to its jurisdiction, was not entitled to credit against a defendant in another state;
and that divorces pronounced according to the law of onejurisdiction...
ought to be recognized, in the absence of all fraud, as operative and binding everywhere, so far as related to the dissolution qf the marriage... "22
Finally, the Court said that the 4therton case only involved the validity of a divorce granted upon constructive service by a court "of the
state which had always been the undoubted domicil of the husband, and
which was the only matrimonial domicil of the husband and wife."23
It was then held that the decree granted the husband by the Kentucky
Court on grounds of desertion was binding upon the wife, and established
"beyond contradiction that she had abandoned her husband" and "precluded her from asserting that she had left him on account of his cruel
''
treatment. 24
Disregarding, for the moment, the reasons which the Court supplies
for its actual decision, the re-sult of its action is to give to a divorce the attributes of an action in rem and not of one in personam. The Court must
have considered the Kentucky Court as clothed with jurisdiction over
19. See White, J. in Haddock v. Haddock, supra, note 13, 201 U. S. I.c. 571, 584,
and dissenting opinion of Holmes, J. in same case 201 U. S. 1. c. 629. See, also, infra
note 51 and text in connection therewith.
20. 181 U. S. 1. c. 162.
21. 181 U. S. 1. c. 163.
22. 181 U. S. 1. c. 166, quoting from Kent's Commentaries.
23. 181 U. S. 1.c. 171.
24. 181 U. S. 1. c. 173.
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the whole of the marriagerelation. If this had not been thought to have

been the situation, the Kentucky Court could not have settled the matter conclusively unless the wife was amenable to its personal jurisdiction
because, otherwise, the whole of the subject matter of the controversy
would not have been before it. Now jurisdiction of the wife would have
been contingent upon her having been constructively domiciled within
the State, and this domicil, in turn, would have existed only if the wife
had left her husband and gone to New York without cause. But the
Supreme Court did not inquire into the jurisdictional fact of the wife's
innocence or guilt in this matter. Without giving this question any consideration whatever, it held that the Kentucky decree bound the wife
in all respects and she was not privileged to show that she had been guiltless as a wife in leaving her husband and going to New York. The writer,
therefore, believes that the result of the A4therion case is only consistent
with the theory that a divorce proceeding is in rem. If the wife was in.
nocent in going to New York (which she may well have been as a matter
of fact) she was not subject to the Kentucky Court's personal jurisdiction; under such a state of facts, what could the Kentucky Court have
had before it other than the domestic relation in its entirety? It is only
by assuming that the Kentucky Court did have power over this status
that its decree can be regarded (as the federal Supreme Court did regard it) as effective and conclusive.s
The Court justified its decision that the Kentucky divorce bound
the absent wife by saying that if it were held otherwise it would be next to
impossible for the husband to have obtained a divorce. It was said that
if constructive service would not have bound the wife in the Kentucky
action, the husband could only have obtained relief by going to New York
and "by the very fact of suing there" he would have admitted that "she
had acquired a separate domicil, (which he denied,)" and would have disproved "his own ground of action that she had abandoned him in KentuckV."26 It is believed that the learned Court's process of reasoning at
this point must have been somewhat to the following effect: "Divorce
can only be gained at the domicil of one of the parties; the wife, in the
25. "Of course, if the wife left her husband because of his cruelty and without fault on her part, as found by the New York court, she was not guilty of de-

sertion. Yet this court Ii. e.the federal Supreme Courti held that the question of her
desertion was not open but was conclusively settled by the Kentucky decree." Holmes
J. dissenting in Haddock-v. Haddock, supra, note 13, 201 U. S. I. c. 629.
"Moreover, A4therton v. A4therton decides that thejurisdiction of the matrimonial
domicil, at least, to grant a divorce for the wife's desirtion without personal service,
does not depend upon the fact of her desertion, but continues even if the husband's
cruelty has driven her out of the State and she has acquired a separate domicil elsewhere... " Holmes, J. dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, ibid.
26. 181 U.S. 1. . 173.

TiE
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principal case, could not be domiciled in New York unless she was not a
deserter; therefore, if the husband sued in New York as his wife's domiciliary jurisdiction, he would have been compelled to have admitted (to
have given such court jurisdiction) that his wife was rightfully away from
him and by virtue of such an admission, he would have lost his case.
The Court's statements, above quoted, indicate that it felt that ex
parte divorces frequently serve a useful purpose, and also involve the
further rule that a guilty wife is domiciled constructively with her husband. This reasoning, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition
that a divorce proceeding is one in rem to dissolve the marriage. The
wife may well have been domiciled with her husband in Kentucky, but
even if she had not been, as already indicated, the Supreme Court could
have held, and did hold the Kentucky decree conclusive upon the wife
and the New York Court.
In the course of its opinion in the 4therton case, the Supreme Court
said that "if a wife is living apart from her husband, without sufficient
cause, his domicil is in law her domicil and in the absence of any proof of
fraud or misconduct on his part, a divorce obtained by him in the state
of his domicil, after reasonable notice to her ....is valid although she
never in fact resided within the state."27 If this part of the decision were
taken alone, it would lead one to believe that unless the wife were constructively domiciled with her husband, a divorce granted at his domicil,
without personal jurisdiction of his wife, would not bind the latter, because she would not be subject under such conditions to the personal
jurisdiction of the court issuing the divorce. This suggestion would
seem to be a corollary necessarily implied and involved in the quoted statement. The proposition is that the divorce is good because the wife is
subject to the jurisdiction of the husband's domiciliary court. The only
reasonable deduction to make from this is that, if the wife was not so
domiciled, the divorce would be futile and ineffective. Such a rule
would have to proceed on the basis that a divorce action is one in personam; that, absent power over the wife, the court would have no sufficient
jurisidction over the marriage relation so as to be able to finally dissolve the same.
But, as has already been pointed out, the Court in the Aherlon
case never did pass upon the wife's innocence or guilt, and consequently
could not have regarded the Kentucky Court as having juridiction because the wife was constructively domiciled there.. It must have decided,
therefore, that jurisdiction of the status existed, and that that alone was
sufficient. It is, accordingly, urged that this portion of the opinion should
be considered as obiter and, if the writer has correctly stated the rule of
27.

181 U. S. 1.c. 164
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law which it seems to involve, the entire statement seems to be inconsistent with the result which the Court finally reached.
In Thompson v. Thompson 8 the federal Supreme Court had before
it a case which it apparently regarded as being an "all fours" with the
Atherton case 9. There, the husband had procured a divorce a mensa et
thoro in Virginia, the domicil of the husband and the last matrimonial
domicil of the parties, after his wife had left him. Constructive service
of process alone was made upon the wife. The Supreme Court held that
the Virginia decree was valid and should be accredited under the federal
Constitution. It was said that the Atherton case was controlling authority and that "the State of Virginia had jurisdiction over the marriage
relation, and the proper courts of that State could proceed to adjudicate
respecting it upon grounds recognized by the laws of that State, although
the wife had left the jurisdiction and could not be reached by formal
process."3 0
It should be noticed that the Supreme Court said that the Virginia
Courthadjurisdiction over the domestic relation,and that again the Court
did not go into the question of the wife's innocence orguilt in being away
from her husband. It was assumed that the Virginia Court could finally
and effectively deal with the marriage status and conclude the wife from
questioning the propriety of its decree. It is proper, therefore, to say,
that a husband, who remains domiciled in the last matrimonial domicil
after his wife has left him, may procure a valid and effective decree of
divorce there; that the courts of such domiciliary state have jurisdiction
of the marriage status; that they may affect the same to the point of dissolution upon merely constructive service of the absent wife, and that
their adjudication that the husband is innocent and the wife delinquent
in her marital duties may not be attacked in any other state of the
Union. 3' In view of the decision in the Thompson case, as a matter of
authority as well as principle,*the statements in the ltherton case, here28.

(1913) 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347.

29. It has sometimes been said that a divorce a mensa el thoro differs in its
nature from an action for absolute divorce, and must be characterized in every event
as an action in personam. See Pettis v. Pettis (1917) 91 Conn. 608, 101 A. 13, 4 A. L.
R. 852 and note. "A decree ofjudicial separation does not affect status; .... it is not
a final decree, but is terminable at any time by the reconciliation of the parties;.. .it
rests upon the jurisdiction of equity to control the conduct of the parties before it...
Such a decree has no resemblance to a judgment in rem." id. 91 Conn. I. C. 619. This
possible distinction between a divorce a vinculo and one a mensa et thoro was not considered in the Thompson case, supra note 28, and apparently was not insisted upon in
argument before the court.
30. 226 U. S. I. c. 562.
31. Gould v. Crow (1874) 57 Mo. 200; Hughes v. Hughes (1925) 278S. W. (Ky.)
121; Post v.Post(1912) 133 N.Y.Supp.1057 (affirmed without further opinion[19141210
N.Y. 607, 104 N. E. 1139) accord. "That question [i.e. that involved in the assumed
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tofore noted, which seem to be inconsistent with the theory that a divorce
action is one in rem should be disregarded.
II
Suppose that Husband and Wife have been living together, domiciled in State 1; that Husband leaves Wife there, going to State 2, where he
establishes a bonafide domicil, and after so doing sues for divorce; may
2's court without gaining personal jurisdiction of Wife, grant him a divorce valid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause? If other states
need not recognize the decree would it be valid and effective in 2 so as to
bind Wife there?
If the law is that a married woman is constructively domiciled with
her husband whenever she is under a duty to be with him, but not other
wise, and, if in the assumed case the wife was violating her duties by
remaining in 1, a divorce granted in 2 would be valid even though we regard a divorce action as one in personam. The wife, under such conditions
would be domiciled in 2, and accordingly amenable to the personal jurisdiction of its courts based upon substituted service.32 But if a divorce
case] was settled by the Supreme Court of the United States (Atherton v. Atherton,
supra), when it held that, where the husband remained in the state of the matrimonial
domicile, the courts of that state had the power to determine, under reasonable requirements as to notice, whether or not her li.
e. the wife's] absence was justifiable, and
that such determination is entitled to full faith and credit in other states. . . ." 133
N. Y. Supp. 1.c. 1069. Irby v. Wilson (1837) 1 Dev. & Batt (N. C.) 568, contra, must
be disregarded because inconsistent with the established interpretation of the Atherton case.
32. "If the wife did desert her husband in fact....1 understand it not to be disputed that a decree of divorce in the case supposed would be conclusive, and so I
understand it to be admitted that if the court of another State on a retrial of the merits
finds them to have been decided rightly its duty will be to declare the decree a bar to
its inquiry." Holmes, J. dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, supra, note 13, 201 U.
S.1. c. 628. North v. North (1905) 93 N. Y. Supp. 512, same case, (1906) 96 N. Y.
Supp. 1138, 192 N. Y. 563, 85N. E. 1113 (service by publication); Hatch v. Hatch
(1921) 187 N. Y. Supp. 568 (service without the state); Burlen v. Shannon (1874) 115
Mass. 438 (service without the state), accord. See Kendrick v. Kendrick (1905) 188
Mass. 550, 75 N. E. 151. Compare Rontey v. Rontey (1917) 166 N. Y. Supp. 818.
"The decisions of the United States Supreme Court established the principle that a
decree rendered by a court of the matrimonial domicil upon constructive service is
binding on the defendant therein, but a decree rendered upon like service by a court of
the husband's domicile, acquired after deserting his wife, is without jurisdiction. It
does not follow conversely that if a husband bejustified in separating from his wife he
may leave her and acquire a new domicile which will become the constructive domicile
of the wife as well as a new matrimonial domicile." 166 N. Y. Supp. 1. c. 820.
While the authorities seem to establish the proposition that a divorce at a husband's new domicile can be sustained as an action in personam when the wife is constructively domiciled with her husband within such jurisdiction, it should be noted
that the cases are not in absolute accord as to what notice is required to bind a domiciled citizen by a judgment in personam when service of process cannot be secured within
the jurisdiction. See supra note 11. Of course, if a divorce action is to be regarded ts
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action is as narrow as this, 2's courts' jurisdiction would always depend
upon the wife's being wrongfully away from her husband, and this question would be open to inquiry in any court where 2's decree might be
presented for recognition. If such court found that the wife was free to
remain in 1, the decree could be discredited. Obviously, under such a
theory 2's decree would be of little value to the husband, and the matter
in litigation could not be conclusively settled by 2's courts' decisions.
In the light of the result reached by the Atherlon case, however,
there should be no reason for considering a divorce action as being one
merely in personam. Taking into consideration the only portions of the
opinion in that case, which are consistent with the Court's sustention of
the Kentucky decree, a divorce action was characterized there as being
different from one in personam, and it was stated, in substance, that a decree by the plaintiff's domiciliary court should bind the absentdefendant
although the latter was not "within the state nor bound by its laws" = and
effectively dissolved the marriage. It has already been pointed outA
that such a theory requires one to think of a divorce action as one brought
in the plaintiff's domicil to dissolve a relation over which such domicil
necessarily has jurisdiction and power for the purpose of regulating the
domestic relations of its owi citizens. Carrying this doctrine to its logical
conclusion, the proposition would be that the domicil of either spouse
should have such power, because of the interest already mentioned, and
that, therefore, a decree granted in 2 to the husband in the assumed case
would be binding everywhere and entitled to full faith and credit. The
entire relation should be considered as within 2's jurisdiction, concurrently with 1, and 2's court's decree should settle the matter, and preclude
l's court as well as all other courts from again examining the question.n
In Haddock v. Haddock36 the federal Supreme Court was called upon
to decide a case involving the same facts as those stated in the last
supposititious case. A husband had left his wife in New York, there last
matrimonial domicil, gained a domicil in Connecticut, and their obtained
ex parte a divorce upon constructive service of his wife. Later this decree
was pleaded in a New York action, brought* by the wife to divorce
her husband, but it was not accredited. Upon an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court it was held that the Connecticut decree
an action in personam, and the wife personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the
husband's domiciliary court, because she is likewise domiciled there, the divorce

decree will be effective only as a personal decree, if requisite notice of the divorce
action is
33.
34.
35.
36.

given her.
181 U. S.1. c. 162.
See supra note 25 and text in connection therewith.
See Miller v. Miller, supra, note 9.
(1906) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L Ed. 867.
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was not binding upon the New York Court because the former Court did
not have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage.
The opinion in the Haddock case is elaborate, and attempts to make
an exhaustive study of the constitutional phase of the question ofj urisdiction to divorce. To commence with, the Court lays down some propositions
which it considered well settled and fundamental. It then bases its own
decision on these rules and on corollaries which it believed could be
properly deduced from its premises. The rules stated at the outset were
as follows: (1) If a judgment is based upon proper jurisdiction, it must
be fully accredited in all the states of the Union. 37 (2) A personal judgment rendered by a court against a non-domiciled citizen upon merely
constructive or substituted service is not binding because no jurisdiction
is thus acquired of the defendant's person.38 (3) If ajudgment is in )-em,
a court has jurisdiction over "things within its border" to affect the same
even though jurisdiction is not directly had over the person of the owner
of the thing." 9 (4) States have, of necessity, power over the marriage of
their own domiciled citizens, and, if the marriage of a citizen is dissolved
by his or her domiciliary court, such "action is binding in that state as
to such citizen, and the validity of the judgment may not therein be
questioned" on the ground that it was not the exercise of due process. 0
(5) A divorce obtained at a plaintiff's bona fide domicil upon actual service of process within such state upon a non-domiciled defendant is valid
everywhere. 41 (6) Where a husband wrongfully leaves his wife and acquires
a separate domicil, she is not constructively domiciled with him.'2 (7)
Where a wife deserts her husband and he remains in the matrimonial dornicil,"the courts of such state having jurisdiction of the husband may, in
virtue of the duty of the wife to be at the matrimonial domicil, disregard an
unjustifiable absence therefrom, and treat the wife as having a domicil
in that state ..... and as a result have power to render a judgment dis-,
solving the marriage which will be binding upon both parties, and will
be entitled to recognition in all other states by virtue of the full faith
4
and credit clause."'
From these propositions the Court was able to conclude that, although the divorce was valid in Connecticut, because that State had
authority to control the marriage relation of the plaintiff within its bound37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

201
201
201
201
201
201
201

U.
U.
U.
U.
U.
U.
U.

S.A. c. 567.
S. 1.c. 567.
S. 1. c. 569.
S. 1.c. 569.
S. 1.c. 570.
S. 1. c. 570.
S. 1. c. 571 elseq.
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aries,"4 still the divorce decree could not be operative as a personal judgment against the wife, because she was neither served with process within
Connecticut, nor was she (her husband having deserted her) constructively domiciled in Connecticut.4 Having thus held that the Connecticut
decree could not be sustained as a decree in personam, and did not have
to be accredited by the New York Court on such a basis the Court inquired: Is a proceeding for divorce of such an exceptional character as
not to come within the rule limiting the authority of a state to persons
within its jurisdiction, but on the contrary, because of the power which
government may exercise over the marriage relation, is it Can exception
to that rule," and, therefore, "embraced within the letter or the spirit of
the doctrines" which control in actions in rem, and dispense with the
necessity of a court having personal jurisdiction over a defendant to affect his or her status and rights. ?46
This query is disposed of by saying that if a divorce action is one in
rem, the res would have to consist of the marriage relation, and "as the
marriage was celebrated in New York between citizens of that State, it
must be admitted ....that before the husband deserted the wife in New
York, the res was in New York and not in Connecticut" and "as the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in New York, never established a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut" it could not be said that "he
4
took with him the marital relation from which he fled to Connecticut."'
It was further said that the husband could have taken with him only
so much of the domestic relation "as concerned his individual status"
and that, therefore, he must have left in New York "so much of the relation as pertained to the status of the wife" and as to this portion of the
status, which was still rightfully in New York, the Connecticut Court had
no jurisdiction. 8 It was accordingly held that the New York Court
was not compelled to recognize the Connecticut decree, but was free
to entertain the wife's action.
The Haddock case was decided after Atherton v. AItherton.'4 It has
already been pointed out that the latter case could not have been based
on the ground that the court, which granted the divorce, had power over
the marriage relation by reason of the fact that the defendant was domi44. This proposition seems open to serious question, as a matter of principle.
Unless a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action (whether it be either
the person of the defendant, or the relation or status) its judgment rendered therein
is not predicated upon due process. This proposition is elementary. See Pennoyer v.
Neff, supra note 5.

45. 201 U. S. 1. c. 572.
46. 201 U. S. L c. 572 et seq.
47. 201 U. S. 1. c. 577.
48. 201 U. S. 1. c. 577.
49. Supra, note 14.
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ciled within its juridsiction; 0 that the Supreme Court of the United
States must have decided in that case, to be consistent with the result
that it reached, that one spouse's domiciliary court had complete jurisdiction of the whole status, so as to be able to destroy the same, even
though such destruction would affect an absent defendant not subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction. It seems, therefore, that the actual
fact is that the Haddock case is not in accord with the principles established in the Atherton case, which were later followed in Thompson v.
Thompson.51 But the Court found itself able to reconcile its decision with
.4therton v. Ytherton by saying that the divorce in that case was granted
at the matrimonial domicil against a wife, who was wrongfully away from
her husband, and for that reason constructively domiciled with him."2
Of course, no such finding was made in the Atherton case,63 and in Thumpson v. Thompson a divorce was again sustained against an absent wife
without the Court's considering, much less passing upon, the innocence
or guilt of the wife in having left her husband. In spite of this misinterpretation of the facts in the Atherton case, both cases today stand as
authority in their respective fields. This means that until either one or
the other of the decisions is overruled, under one state of facts the federal
Supreme Court is committed to the doctrine that a divorce action is one
in rem, while, under different conditions, it regards the identical action
as one in personam.
So long as the Haddock case represents the last word of the Supreme
Court it must be concluded that a divorce granted to a husband at his
domicil, which was not the last matrimonial domicil, will not be binding
upon any other state court unless either (1) the decree is based upon personal service of process upon the wife within the domain ofsuchdomicil50. Supra, note 25 and text in connection therewith.
51. "There is no difference, so far as I can see, between .4therton v. /1therion
and the present case, except that in dtherton v. Atherton the forum of the first decree
was that of the matrimonial domicil, whereas in this the court was that of a domicil
afterwards acquired ....... I can see no ground for giving a less effect to the decree
when the husband changes his domicil after the separation has taken place .. .
Holmes, J. dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. I. c. 629 ets eq.
52. 201 U. S. I. c. 571 and 614.
53. "Of course, if the wife in the Atherton case left her husbandl because of his
cruelty and without fault on her part, as found by the New York court, she was not
guilty of desertion. Yet this court held that the question of her desertion was not
open but was conclusively settled by the Kentucky decree." Holmes, J. dissenting 201
U. S. I. c. 629.
54. "This [The Haddock case) was a five to four decision ....but the majority
ruling, to those of us who can well recall, was a shock to the bar of the nation. As Mr.
Justice Holmes justly remarks in his dissent, there is no difference between Haddock
v. Haddock and Atherton v. Atherton ....yet exactly opposite rulings are made.
Graves, J. in Howey v. Howey (1922) 240 S. W. (Mo.) 450, 453.
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iary courtt or (2) it is determined, in favor of the husband, that the wife
was unjustified in being away from him. As .to this last situation, any
court to which such a decree is presented will be free to examine into the
question of the wife's innocence, and if it should find this fact against
the husband, it may disregard the divorce.5 6 But under such conditions
the. federal Supreme Court will be obliged to also examine the question.
The matter involves accrediting a foreign judgment under the federal
Constitution, and that Court must, therefore, decide whether or not the
judgment was based upon proper jurisdiction. If the wife was guilty,
the decree was predicated upon due process and the Constitution requires its recognition, and it is for the Supreme Court to finally deter57
mine this question.
While it was held in the Haddock case that a divorce granted a husband at his separate domicil other than that where the parties were
last living together as husband and wife need not be accredited in other
states, the Supreme Court stated that such a divorce would be valid
within the state where rendered, and effectively terminate the marriage
as to both the parties there 58 The Court concedes the husband's domiciliary court this inherent power over the dissolution of the marriage relation so far as its own citizens are concerned. It is only in other jurisdictions that the validity of the divorce may be questioned. Moreover,
the Supreme Court stated in the Haddock case that any state may, if

55. "Where a bonafide domicil has been acquired in a State by either of the
parties to a marriage, and a suit is brought by the domiciled party in such State for a

divorce, the courts of that State, if they acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other

party, have authority to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to be enforced in every
State by the full faith and credit clause." 201 U. S. 1.c. 570. Compare Jones v. Jones

(1888) 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707. But see dictum in Lister v. Lister (1916) 86 N. J.

Eq. 30, 44, 97 A. 170.

56. This is what the New York Court did in the Haddock case, and its position

was sustained by the Supreme Court.

57. "Furthermore, since the question involves giving full faith and credit to

the decree of the first court, there will always be an appeal to the Supreme Court of

the United States if the second court finds the jurisdictional facts differently from the
first; and the question there can be definitely settled." Beale, Haddock Revisited
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 428.
58. "Where a court of one State ....

has acted concerning the dissolution of the

marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such action is binding in that State as to

such citizen, and the validity of the judgment may not therein be questioned on the
ground that the actions of the State in dealing with its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution." 201 U. S.
l..c. 569. See, also, Davis v. Davis (1893) 22 N. Y. Supp. 191; Ransom v. Ransom
(1908) 109 N. Y. Supp. 1143; Atkinson v. Atkinson (1912) 43 Utah 53, 134 P. 595, ac.
cord. See (accordon the general proposition) Lepenser v. Griffin (1920) 146 La. 583, 83
So. 839; Barber v. Barber (1915) 151 N. Y. Supp. 1064.
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it so desires, accredit the divorce upon principles of comity."9 The rule
accordingly is that while a husband, having such a divorce, may not
insist upon its recognition by other courts in the Union, heWmay throw
himself upon the mercy of a foreign jurisdiction, and his divorce can be
recognized there if the courts are so disposed. The tendency of most
courts in the United States is to hold such divorces binding and conclusive.10

III
Assume that the facts are the same as in the last supposititious case,
except that the action for divorce is brought by the wife at the last matrimonial domicil, instead of by the husband at his new domicil, and that the
husband is only served with process constructively. Will such a divorce
bind the husband in other states? It is assumed that under the decision
in the Haddock case that the divorce will be effective within the state
where rendered. 1
So far as the writer knows, this question has never been passed upon
by the federal Supreme Court, and the entire matter is open to speculation. Even if we are free to consider a divorce action as being in rem within what seems to be the principle of the Atherton case,62 a decree rendered
in favor of the wife at the last matrimonial domicil of the parties would
59. "And as a corollary of the recognized power of a government thus to deal
with its own citizen by a decree which would be operative within its own border, irrespective of any extraterritorial efficacy, it follows that the right of another sovereignty exists, under principles of comity, to give to a decree so rendered such efficacy
as to that government may seem to be justified by its conceptions of duty and public
policy." 201 U. S. 1. c. 570.
60. Anthony v. Rice (1892) 110 Mo. 223, 19 S. W. 423;Lieber v. Lieber (1911)
239 Mo. 1, 143 S. W. 458; Howard v. Strode (1912) 242 Mo. 210, 146 S. W. 792, 146 S.
W. 799; Silveyv. Silvey (1915) 192 Mo. App. 179,180 S. W. 1071; Howey v. Howey
(1922) 240 S. W. (Mo) 450; Holdorfv. Holdorf (1924) 197 N. W. (Iowa) 910; Searles
v. Searles (1918) 140 Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 133; see, also, Felt v. Felt (1899) 59 N.
J. Eq. 606, 45 A. 105, 49 A. 1071. "It is our policy to recognize the validity in this
State of such foreign divorces. There is nothing in the Haddock case which in the
slightest degree seeks to control our policy in this regard. This policy violates no
rights under either the State or Federal Constitution." Ferriss, P. J. in Howard v.
Strode, supra 242 Mo. 1. c. 225. Contra: Colvin v. Reed (1867) 55 Pa. 375; compare
Davis v. Davis (1921) 70 Colo. 37, 197 P. 241.
In Wagoner v. Wagoner (1920) 287 Mo. 567,229 S. W. 1064, a divorce granted to
the husband without personal service upon the wife was denied validity because the
husband didnot have a bonafide domicil within the jurisdiction granting the divorce.
In the course of its opinion the Court apparently expresses unqualified approval of the
decision in Haddock v. Haddock (187 Mo. 597 et seq.) This portion of the decision
may be taken as obiter, and, in any event, in view of the later decision in Howey v.
Howey, supra, can not be regarded as controlling in Missouri.
61. See supra, note 58.
62. See supra, note 25 and text in connection therewith.
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not be conclusive upon the husband unless the wife retained her domicil in that state at the time that she brought her action. Giving a divorce
action the widest possible scope, it must be brought at the domicil of at
least one of the parties. 3 Obviously, this divorce action is not brought
at the domicil of the husband; the court's jurisdiction, therefore, must
depend upon the wife's being a domiciled citizen; absent such fact, the
court has no power to act and terminate the marriage.
Jurisdiction to divorce in the assumed case, then, will depend upon
the wife's legal ability to continue domiciled at the last matrimonial
domicil, apart from her husband, after he had left her. If the law is that
a wife is competent in every event to maintain a separate domicil, the
case would be clear and the divorce would be valid as a decree in rem
and should be accredited in every state in the Union just as the decree
in the 4itherton case was sustained. But most authority is to the effect
that a wife may only acquire a separate domicil, when she is under no
duty to be with her husband, and the federal Supreme Court seems committed to this view. 64 If this rule, limiting the wife's capacity to gain a
domicil, is to prevail, the court of the last matrimonial domicil of the
parties would not have jurisdiction to grant a divorce, if the wife was
absent from her husband without cause. Again, this matter is ajurisdictional fact; accordingly, as above stated, every court which is asked to
recognize the decree may examine the question of the propriety of the
wife's conduct in absenting herself from her husband, and a finding that
the wife was not free from guilt in this direction would warrant the decree's being discredited unless such finding were ultimately reversed by
Supreme Court of the United States., Upon principle, therefore, it is
believed that a divorce rendered, under the assumed facts, at the matrimonial domicil in favor of the wife can not be said to be conclusive so
long as the proposition is that a wife, who is delinquent in her marital
duties, is constructively domiciled with her husband, even though one
is warranted in saying that a divorce action is one in rein.
In view of the opinion in Haddock v. Haddock, however, it seems impossible to characterize a divorce action as one in rem, and to take the
decision in Althertor v. .4therton literally. It may be, and since the decision in Thompson v. Thompson, is highly probable that the .dtherton case
will continue to control in cases that are actually on "all fours with it".
Still at the same time, the writer does not feel that we are free to ignore
the sweeping statement-, of the late Chief Justice in the Haddock case
in substance to the effect that a divorce action, when it comes to the mat63.
64.

See supra, note 1.
Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562,26 Sup. Ct. 525, SO L. Ed. 867;

see, also, supra, note 12 and cases there cited.
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ter of accrediting a decree rendered therein, is not an action in rem, but
one in personam, and his further statement that the .4therlon case was
properly decided because the defendant wife there, although absent
from her husband's domicil, was constructively domiciled with him, and,
for that reason, personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the divorce decree. The Haddock case made an exhaustive
study of the nature of a divorce action, and the Court approved the proposition that normally a divorce decree, absent personal jurisdiction over
the defendant,.does not have to be recognized in a sister state. There is
no reason, so far as the writer can see, to believe that this rule will not
be applied to all divorce decrees rendered in actions where the situation
is not the same as that in the Ithertoncase, and consequently not con trolled by that authority. Of course, if the principles approved in the Haddock case are adopted in the assumed case, a divorce rendered in favor of
the wife at the last matrimonial domicil of the parties upon merely constructive service of a non-domiciled husband will not have to be recognized in sister states. Under such conditions, no personal jurisdiction of the
husband will have been gained and he will not be bound by the decree.
Any court may, however, if it is so inclined, on principles of comity, heretofore discussed, recognized such a divorce, but the wife may not insist
as a matter of right that it is binding.
Occasionally the decision in the Haddock case has been construed
to mean that the court of the last matrimonial domicil of the parties, so
long at least as one of the parties remains there, has power to grant an
effective divorce even though the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of such court personally. 5 Sometimes this position is assumed
without any discussion or argument. Sometimes, however, it is said that
this proposition is a corollary, necessarily resulting from the actual decision in that case. The argument to this effect is somewhat along the
following lines: "It was decided in the Haddock case that a deserting
husband could not take the matrimonial domicil with him from New
York to Connecticut so as to clothe the courts of the latter State with
power over the marriage relation as it affected the wife in New York.
If the husband could not do this, then thematrimonial relation must have
remained with the wife in New York and, therefore, the courts of this State
must have retained power and jurisdiction to entirely terminate the mar-

65. Schenker v. Schenker (1918) 169 N. Y. Supp. 35; Griflin v. Griffin (1909)
54 Tex. Civ. App. 619, 117 S. W. 910. See, also, Goodyear v. Reynolds (1922) 134 S.
C. 228, 117 S. E. 538. The cases generally concede this. See note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1.c.
634.
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riage." ' These suggestions do not seertf to be convincing and indicate,
it is believed, a misunderstanding of the learned Court's meaning in the
Haddock case.
In the first place, the Court in the Haddock case considered a divorce
action, normally, as being one in personam. In order to demonstrate
that the Connecticut Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
wife, it showed that that State was not the matrimonial domicil of the
parties, and that the wife, for this reason, was not constructively domiciled there. If Connecticut had been the matrimonial domicil of the parties, that fact would have determined the case in favor of the husband,
because, according to the Court's notion, it would have brought the wife
personally within the power of the Connecticut Court. It is believed
that this was the only reason for the Court's emphasizing the fact that
Connecticut was not the matrimonial domicil of the parties, and there
seems to be'no justification for assuming that the Court meant to lay
down a rule, even by way of dictum, that a court of the last matrimonial
domicil of the parties, as such, has jurisdiction in rein to dissolve the
marriage relation. Finally, it must be siid against any such construction, as that last mentioned, of the Haddock case that the Court specifically held that the husband did carry with him so much of the
marriage relation as affected his own individual staltns, and did subject
that much of the marriage relation to the jurisdiction of the Connecticut
Court. This holding, precludes any assumption to the effect that
the court of the last niatrimonial domicil of the parties could, absent
personal jurisdiction over the husband, render a valid decree of divorce
in favor of the wifl. Nevertheless, such a notion prevails in several
quarters, and there are several decisions sustaining divorces of this kind,
and doing so, not as a matter of comity, but under the belief that they
must be accredited under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. It is ventured to suggest that there is no real basis for believ66. "Can it reasonably be contended that the husband may obtain a dissolution
at the matrimonial domicil binding upon all in a case where the wife deserts him, but
the wife may not do so when the husband abandons the wife?..... The Supreme
Court of the United States .... clearly points out that the fiction that the domicil
of the husband is that of the wife does not apply where, as in this case, the husband has
wrongfully abandoned the wife. In such a case the husband cannot draw to himself
by virtue of the fiction the domicil of the wife; but the matrimonial-that is, the juisdictional--domicil remains with the wife and within the state of that domicil." State
v. Morse (1906) 31 Utah 213, 217, 87 P. 705. "The state having jurisdiction of the
matrimonial domicil and of one spouse,-innocent according to the decisions of the
courts of that State of matrimonial wrong, has juridiction of the matrimonial status
and is clothed with power, after reasonable ex rei notice, to enter judgments concerning it, which must be recognized by courts of the jurisdiction of the other spouse."
Perkins v. Perkins (1916) 225 Mass. 82, 87, 113 N. E. 841 (dictum). See, also dictum
in Thompson v. Thompson, supra, note 30.
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ing that such a divorce is valid everywhere, as a matter of federal Constitutional law; that until there is an authoritative ruling on this question by the Supreme Court it is an unwarranted assumption to say that
such a divorce will be good in states other than that where it is rendered.
IV
The last possible situation, where the validity of a foreign divorce
decree may be questioned, is where the partits have separated, and the
wife seeks a divorce upon constructive service of her husband at her alleged domicil, which is not, however, the last matrimonial domicil of the
couple. It may be that in this case the husband has remained at the last
matrimonial domicil, or established a new home elsewhere, but it is not
perceived how this fact could affect the question of the wife's domiciliary
court's power to conclusively terminate the marriage.
All the difficulties against sustaining such a divorce under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause are met with here that were encountered in the
case where the wife sought a divorce at the last matrimonial domicil.
Unless a divorce action is one entirely in rem and the wife is also legally
capable of establishing her own separate domicil in every event, it iq believed that such a divorce may not be conclusive.
Such a decree could not be sustained as one in personans because
the husband was not domiciled within the state where it was rendered.
He is always privileged to settle where he sees fit, and is never constructively domiciled with his wife. It follows, therefore, that if the holding
in the Haddock case that a divorce action is usually one in personam
controls (and it must be considered as controlling) a divorce granted by
the wife's new domiciliary court will not be binding in another jurisdiction. But even were the federal Supreme Court to disregard the Haddock
case and return to the broad principle, which the writer believes that the
dtherton case must have stood for, namely, that a divorce action is one
directed against the marriage relation, which is subject in its entirety
to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary court of either spouse, a divorce
granted to the wife in the assumed case would not necessarily be conclusive in other jurisdictions. If the fiction that a guilty wife is constructively domiciled with her husband is to prevail, the wife will have no
domicil where she brings her action unless it is her legal privilege to be
living there. This is the same old jurisdictional fact, which may always
be inquired into by any court that is asked to accredit the decree. If the
latter court finds that the wife is guilty in being away from her husband,
the divorce can be disregarded unless the federal Supreme Court should
reverse such a finding, thereby making the court which gave the divorce
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a domiciliary court and clothing it with jurisdiction over the marriage

relation.
It is believed, therefore, that it is proper, to say that a divorce granted in the assuned case, in the face of existing authority, cannot be regarded as binding, 6 7 and will never be so unless the Supreme Court is
willing to reverse itself and hold (1) that a divorce action is one in rem,
and (2) that a married woman has the legal power to acquire a domicil
apart from her husband whenever she is living away from him with appropriate intentions. Of course, under the Haddock case, the divorce will
be valid where granted, if the wife was actually domiciled there, and as
a matter of comity may be accredited by any other state court that desires to do so.6s

It has already been pointed out that there is a disposition upon the
part of some courts to say that the Haddock case requires a divorce
granted to either spouse by a court of the last matrimonial domicil to be
accredited under the federal Constitution. Conceding that this is a
proper interpretation of that decision, it will not aid in the sustention of
a divorce granted under the assumed facts. The jurisdiction to which
the wife removed, even though she were free from guilt in being away
from her husband, did not become a matrimonial domicil, because the
husband had never settled there, nor been under a duty so to do.",
67. Thompson v. Thompson (1918) 89 N.J. Eq. 70, 103 A. 856 (statute); Re
Kimball's Estate (1898) 155 N.Y. 62,49 N. E. 331; Baylis v. Baylis (1913) 207 N.Y.
446, 101 N. E. 176. See, also, McCreery v. Davis (1894) 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178.
68. In Williams v. Williams (1893) 53 Mo. App. 617, such a divorce was recognized, the court erroneously holding that it was binding under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution. See, accord with the text, Buckley v. Buckley
(1908) 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079; Shafer v. Bushnell (1869) 24 Wis. 372. See, also,
Anthonyr. Rice (1892) 110 Mo. 223, 19 S. W. 423; Taylor v.Taylor (1912) 64 Fla. 521,
60 So. 116. If personal service is made upon the husband, the divorce is binding under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Dawson v. Torre (1921) 116 S. C. 338, 108 S. _.101.
69. But see, Montmorency v. Montmorency (1911) 139 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.)
1168; Parker v. Parker (1915) 222 Fed. 186 (dictum). "As we have said, to our minds
the case of Haddock v. Haddock is based on the fiction that the matrimonial domicile
stays with and follows the innocent party, whether husband or wife, and that, no
matter vWhere the innocent party may be, the matrimonial domicile is there, and the
guilty party is always constructively present, and therefore the court of that state
has constructively both parties before it." 139 S. W. 1. c. 1172.
In Montmorency's case, the Texas Court granted the wife a divorce upon constructive service of the husband. Texas was not the matrimonial domicil in the sense
that the parties had lived there as man and wife. The Court believed that it could
render a divorce that would be binding in all the States of the Union, because it
thought that the wife,when wrongfully abandoned by her husband, retained the marriage relation and could take it with her to a new domicil and subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of such a new domicil. Professor Beale (Haddock Revisited,
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 426) characterizes the Montmorency case as "as excellent statement of the meaning of the decision in the Haddock case." The writer ventures the opinion that the meaning attributed to Haddock v. Haddock in Montmo-
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V
As a result of the foregoing analysis of the federal authorities, it is
believed that there are only three situations, where it c*an be said with
any degree of certainty that a foreign divorce must be held binding under
the federal Constitution in all the States of the Union, namely, (1) where
the husband obtains it at his own domicil, which was also the last matrimonial domicil of the parties upon constructive service of his wife;"o (2)
where he obtains it at his domicil, which he has established after leaving
his wife upon constructive service of the latter, but in order that such divorce may be binding elsewhere, it must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court, which is asked to recognize the divorce, or to the federal
Supreme Court, upon a review of the former court's decision, that the
wife was under a duty to be with her husband; 7 ' and (3) where thedivorce
is obtained by either spouse at the domicil of one of the parties after
personal service of process upon the defendant within the jurisdiction.72
rency's case is not justified. The majority opinion in the Haddock case regarded a
divorce action as one in personam. It attemped to explain Atherton v. Atherton on
that basis by saying that the wife in that case was unjustifiably absent from her husband, and was, therefore, subject to the matrimonial domicil's court's jurisdiction.
See supra,note 53 and text in connection therewith. Obviously under the theory adopted in Montmorency's case a divorce action must be regarded as one in rem. A divorce
was granted in that case to the wife at her separate domicil, without the court's having gained personal jurisdiction of the husband, a non-domiciled party. The court
thought itself able to do this because it said that the wife as an innocent party could
carry the matrimonial res from the matrimonial domicil to her afteracquired domicil.
It is submitted that such a notion of the Haddock case does not even approximate the
actual decision; nor can the writer find any dicta therein upon which to base such a
rule.
In Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. 1. 87, a divorce was granted a wife ather separate
domicil (because she was rightfully away from her husband) upon constructive
service of the husband. The basis of that decision was not that the court which granted the divorce became a matrimonial domiciliary court. The broad rule was there
stated to be that any domiciliary court has power to grant a divorce, because the ac.
tion was one in rem. The entire res was regarded as being before any domiciliary tribunal.
70. Thompson v. Thompson, supra, note 28.
71. See supra, note 32 and cases there cited.
72. See supra, note 41. Suppose that one spouse goes to the domicil of the other,
this latter jurisdiction not being his or her own domicil, and there sues for a divorce,
(the local statute so permitting) upon actual service of process upon the defendant;
would such a divorce be valid everywhere within the Full Faith and Credit Clause?
It is to be noted that White, J. in the Haddock case (201 U.S. I. c. 570) says that the
divorce must be brought in a domiciliary court by the "domiciled party." This statement was dictum and, therefore, carries with it no controlling implication that at divorce, under the assumed facts, would be invalid. It would seem that such a divorce
would be proper. Haddock's case merely involves the proposition that normally a
divorce action is to be regarded as one in personam, and that a divorce, granted
at a domiciliary court of merely one of the spouses, without jurisdiction of the defendant's person, is not predicated upon due process. But the Haddock case concedes
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Perhaps decrees granted under different facts and conditions will ultimately be sustained by the United States Supreme Court. But, as the writer
has endeavored to point out, it stems that to do so will involve a repudiation of mostifnotall of the doctrines announced in the Haddock case and
a return to the principles upon which the .Atherton case must have been
based to the effect that a divorce action is one in rein in the fullest sense.
of that term.
It is clear, however, that under the federal authorities every state
has the power to grant its own citizens a divorce upon constructive service, which will be effective as due process within its ownjurisdiction even
against a non-domiciled spouse, who has never come within its domain
and, therefore, has not become subject in any way to the jurisdiction of
such state's court. The opinion in the Haddock case concedes such authority to every domiciliary court, and perhaps implies that such control
over a marriage is essential for orderly regulation of domestic affairs."
While such a decree, unless it falls within one of the three mentioned
situations, need not be recognized under the federal Constitution by
other state courts, such courts are free to accredit it if so disposed.
There is no legal impediment in the way of a husband abandoning
one domicil and establishing another; he may gain a new domicil even
though he may not at the time of so doing make proper provision for his
wife; noris there anything to prevent a wife gaining a new domicil away
from her husband, at least if she is under no duty to be with him. It is
apparent, thcrefore, that cases are sure to occur where either a husband
or a wife will be found, legally established in a separate bonafidedomicil,
seeking a divorce there without the court of such a state being able to acquire personal jurisdiction of the other party to the marriage. It will
also be inevitable that such domiciliary court, under such facts, will
grant a divorce.7 4. Domiciliary jurisdictions will free their own citizens
that either domiciliary court may grant a divorce, because it is sufficiently interested
in the domestic relation. If, then, such a court has jurisdiction of the defendant's person, no more should be needed to make a divorce, granted under such conditions, valid
everywhere. So far as the writer knows this case has never been before the federal
Supreme Court. See Cole v. Cole (1924) 96 N. J. Eq. 206, 124 A. 359. Compare
Lister v. Lister (1916) 86 N. J. Eq. 30,40,97 A. 170. But the statutory remedy is usually confined to residents. See, Pate v. Pate (1878) 6 Mo. App. 79; note (1925) 39

A. L. R. I. c. 717.
73. 201 U. S. I. c. 569. The Court says that every government "must" have
"inherent" power over the marriage relation of its own domiciled citizens, regardless
of whether or not the other spouse has the same domicil.
74. Curiously enough courts which have been unwilling to recognize foreign
divorce decrees under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock have been compelled,

pursuant to mandatory legislation, to grant divorces to their own domiciled citizens
of the same kind as the foreign divorces which they refuse to recognize. See Ransom
v. Ransom (1908) 125 App. Div. 915, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1143.
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from the bonds of matrimony, pursuant to their own policies, regardless
of what may be the views of other states concerning divorce and the
grounds upon which it should be granted. It is also certain that there never
will be unanimity of opinion in the various states as to what should constitute grounds for divorce. Some jurisdictions, in the eyes of others, will
be too liberal, and some too strict. What then should be the attitude of
a court with respect toaforeign decree, granted at the separate domicil
of one of the parties without personal jurisdiction of the other, which it
is not constitutionally bound to recognize?
If a foreign decree of divorce is not recognized, we shall always have
the curious and unnatural result of a man and woman being unmarried
in one state but married in another. So long as the parties remain in
this position, it is perhaps not an impossible situation, but it hardly seems
a desirable one. But often parties do not continue in the condition that
existed immediately following the divorce; frequently remarriage occurs
and as likely as not children are born of the second marriage. Under
such conditions, if the divorce is not recognized as effective, the unfortunate situation will be that a man or a woman will be living in adultery
in one state, and that children born of the union will be illegitimate.
Such a condition of affairs, from a practical as well as from a moral point
of view, must be regarded as intolerable. It would, therefore, seem that
the very much lesser of two evils would be for a court which is asked to
recognize the foreign decree to do so and, as a result, avoid rendering
adulterous such subsequent marriages and bastardizing children born
thereof. Some courts, recognizing these unfortunate consequences, which
may result from a refusal to accredit foreign decrees, have been liberal
enough to so do regardless of any interest they may have had in the marriage relation thus affected. The position taken is that it is better policy,
in the long run, to consider the marriage terminated by the decree, even
though in the first instance, had the matter been presented to them,
they would not have granted a divorce upon the grounds upon which it
75
was entered.
75. "From our point of view, the operation of such a doctrine [i.
e. the doctrine
of Haddock v. Haddock] results in much practical injustice to innocent parties, and
is repugnant to the larger public policy which should govern the states in their mutual
relations. If it were adopted by all of the states, it could hardly fail to result in bedlam
and confusion. It would become a veritable trap for the innocent victims of second
marriages .....
"A repudiation by the courts of one state of the decrees entered in another on a
subject which so permeates the domestic life and the status of innocent persons must
ultimately result in a new and exceptional status, that of the half-divorced and halfbigamous, and that of contingent legitimacy. A child of the new status could maintain
his legitimacy only so long as he remained within the confines of one state." Miller
v. Miller (1925) 200 Ia. 1193, 206 N. W. 262, 265.
"(1) A divorce suit is a proceeding in rem; (2) the status of husband and wife is
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At the same time other courts, while admitting the desirability of
accrediting foreign divorce decrees, have been unwilling to do so unless
the defendant-spouse received actual notice of the pendency of the divorce action. Under such a line of reasoning, it is said that the divorce
will be recognized if the defendant had an opportunity to defend against
the action, butnot otherwise. These courts think that it is essentially unfair to bind a non-domiciled defendant, not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court which grants the divorce, unless an opportunity has
been afforded to him or her to defendupon the merits. They are willing to
recognize the decree although not constitutionally required to do so, if
notice has been brought home to the absent party of the fact of the pendency of the action. 76 Such a requirement would seem to go further than
actual "due process" often demands. Notice of the pendency of an action
has not by any means always been held essential to bind an absent defendant. The usual rule is that merely the bestmeans under theparticular
circumstances of a given case must be used to bring notice of the action
home to the defendant. 77 It would seem, therefore, that the position that

these courts take is rather extreme, and goes further than analogous cases
have as a rule required. Of course, if the absence of personal notice to
the defendant-spouse is a valid objection to the sustention of the decree,
it should serve to prevent the recognition of the same by any tribunal..
even though such court has no especial interest in the defendant or the
the res; (3) the status attaches to each of the parties; (4) such status (the res) goes

with each of the parties to their respective domiciles; (5) the wife can have a separate
domicile from the husband; (6) every state has the sovereign right to determine the
domestic relations of all persons having their domicile within its territory; (7) where
either husband or wife has a domicile in the state, the courts of the state have jurisdiction over the status (the res), and for proper causes can dissolve the marriage relation; and (8) the decree sopronouncedisajudgmentinrem." Graves, J. inHowey v.
Howey, 240 S. W. (Mo.) 450, 454. The foregoing excerpt illustrates admirably the
attitude of the Missouri Courts with respect to a foreign divorce decree. If a decree
is granted by a domiciliary court that ends the matter. Perhaps the learned Judge

overstates the law in Missouri in proposition 5, quoted above. The writer doubts
whether it is proper under the authorities to say that a wife may in every event
acquire a domicil apart from her husband. Whether a wife may do so when it is her
duty to be with him, qu? See supra, note 12, and authorities there cited.
Apparently, under the Missouri authorities, a foreign divorce decree may not be
collaterally attacked; Howey v. Howey, supra. But, see, Wagoner v. Wagoner (1920)
287 Mo. 567, 229 S. W. 1064.
76. Joyner v. Joyner (1908) 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182; Solomon v. Solomon
(1913) 140 Ga. 379, 78 S. E. 1079; Felt v. Felt (1899) 59 N. J. Eq. 606, 45 A. 105;
Flower v. Flower (1886) 42 N. J. Eq. 152, 7 A. 669. See, also, Wand v. Wand (1924)
155 La. 257,99 So. 211; Perkins v. Perkins (1916) 225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841.
77. ' "No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiringjurisdiction beyond service or appearance ......
McDonald v. Mabee (1916) 243 U. S. 90,
91, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608. See Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure (1922) 41
et seq. It is certainly true that in actions in rem actual notice of the tendency of the
action is not essential to the entry of a valid judgment.
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marriage relation. The objection is that the decree is inherently unjust,
because it bears no semblance to due process.
Assuming that absence of notice to the defendant of the pendency
of the divorce action is not a valid objection to the recognition of a decree
rendered therein, or, if it is, that such notice has been given, what further
objection can be advanced to the sustention of the decree when it need
not be recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and what
courts are in a position to make such objection? Suppose that the parties have been living together as man and wife in State 1; that the
plaintiff procures a divorce in State 2, a newly acquired domicil, upon
constructive service of the defendant, the latter having remained domiciled in State 1. Why should l's court refuse to recognize 2's decree?
Some courts have taken the extreme position that under no circumstances would the divorce granted in 2 be recognized in 1 because it is
an unwarrantable interference with a domestic relation which is subject
to its exclusive jurisdiction. It is said that, so far as defendant's status is
concerned, it is for l's court to control the same, absent personal jurisdiction over him or her acquired by 2's court. Under such decisions jurisdiction is absolutely denied 2's court, and the merits of the case will not
be considered to any extent. The proposition is rigidly maintained that
no court can affect the status of l's domiciled citizen of whom it has no
personal jurisdiction. Protection of a domiciled citizen's status is made
all important, and the fact that 2 has jurisdiction to free the plaintiff as
its citizen is ignored so far as the federal authorities make this possible. 8
While there are decisions that go this far, others take a midway position and hold that the divorce granted by 2's court will be recognized
if it was rendered upon grounds that would have been recognized as proper for divorce in 1, and no fraud was practiced by the plaintiff in procuring the decree.79 Courts which adhere to this rule feel that a domestic
po!icy demands that the marriage relation of its domiciled citizens be
maintained unless its dissolution be sanctioned by their own law; that
a plaintiff-spouse may not circumvent this policy by going elewhere and
pj ocuring a divorce. These courts are willing to permit another tribunal
78. "The injured party in the married relation must seek redress in the forum
of the defendnt. . . .'in proceeding to dissolve a marriage'. . .'the parties stand upon
a level of rights; when the injured party seeks a new domicil, and the domicils are,
therefore, actually different, there is no greater reason why the husband's new domicil
should prevail over the wife's than t'hat hers should prevail over his. In this aspect,
justice requires that neither should draw the other within the folds of a foreign jurisdiction'...." Reel v. Elder (1869) 62 Pa. 308, 314. See, also, People v. Shaw (1913)
259 Il1. 544, 102 N. E. 1031; People v. Baker (1879) 76 N. Y. 78.
79. Joyner v. Joyner (1908) 131 Ga. 217,62S. E. 182;Humphreysv. Humphreys
(1924) 139 Va. 146, 123 S. E. 554: Corvin v. Commonwealth (1921) 131 Va. 649, 108
S. E. 651. See, also, Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve (1914) 88 Conn. 689, 92 A. 684.
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to terminate the marriage, but only upon grounds that are in acc.ordwith
their own policy. These cases are obviously less severe than those which
deny all power to 2's court to affect the marriage relation beyond 2's

jurisdiction, but they fail to consider and weigh in the balance the possible undesirable consequences already noted, which may result from
refusing to recognize the decree. The domestic policy of 1 is vindicated at all 'tost.
Let it be assumed that the facts are the same as in the last case
except that, at the time that ihe plaintiff procured a divorce in 2, the
defendant had become domiciled in State 3. Should this fact change l's
court's attitude towards 2's decree, assuming that the general policy of
1 is against the sustension of divorce decrees for the reasons last given?
The proposition firmly embedded in the law of domestic relations is
that power to dissolve a marriage is vested exclusively in the domiciliary
courts of the parties. 0 l's court, by the removal of both the plaintiff
and the defendant from its jurisdiction, before the divorce action was
begun in 2, ceased to be a domiciliary tribunal of either party. l's court
could no longer say that it should refuse to accredit the decree to protect its domiciled citizen, or to maintain its policy against the dissolution
of marriages subject to its jurisdiction. It cannot reasonably be asserted
that after 1 ceased to be the matrimonial domicil, and the domicil of the
defendant that it had any policy of its own to protect or vindicate, which
required it to repudiate the decree of 2. This being the case, l's court
might hold that it had no concern in the marriage at all, and accordingly,
as a matter of comity, recognize 2's divorce. The mere fact that 1 formerly was the matrimonial domicil of the defendant should make no difference. l's interest in the entire matter ceased when the parties moved
beyond its jurisdiction. It is not perceived how the fact that 1 formerly
was a domiciliary jurisdiction has any bearing upon this suggestion.

When that relation ceased l's interest of necessity ended.,'
It follows also logically enough from the foregoing discussion that
where a foreign divorce decree is presented to any court which was not a
domiciliary court of the defendant at the time that the divorce was granted, such court can not be moved properly to repudiate thedecreeby reason
of the fact that it had any policy to further, or any citizen to protect, and
80. See supra, note 1.
81. "But it seems to me that when this principle of state policy is invoked the
party invoking it'must bring himself within its protection. I think, when he attacks
a foreign decree entered against him without personal service on the ground that the
foreign court was without jurisdiction, he must show that he was a resident of the
state of New York at the time that the foreign decree was obtained." Percival v.
Percival (1905) 106 App. Div. 111, 94 N. Y. Supp. 909, affirmed without further
opinion (1906) 186 N. Y. 587, 79 N. E. 1114. See, also, Hubbard v. Hubbard (1920)
228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508.
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such court might for these reasons, regardless of how it might be disposed to act in cases affecting its own citizens, accredit the decree upon
principles of comity.
If the law of a given state is, however, that a foreign divorce decree,
not entitled to recognition under the federal Constitution, should not be
accredited either (1) because it usurps authority over defendants subject exclusively to its domiciliary jurisdiction, or (2) because it violates
its policy concerning the dissolution of the marriage status, it might well
be said that the general principle back of and underlying such a rule is
that no state which has personal jurisdiction merely of the plaintiff may
interfere (except where authorized under federal decisions) with the status
of the defendant unless such defendant's domiciliary courts permitted
such interference. The proposition would be that it is improper for a
court to attempt to affect the domestic relation of an absent non-domiciled citizen of whom no personaljurisdiction has been gained unless the latter's domicil permitted such interference. If such a principle were adopted
the validity of a foreign divorce decree should always be determined by
the law of the defendant's domicil at the time that the divorce was rendered. If such a divorce is presented to a non-domiciliary court it should
be guided in the matter of recognizing or repudiating the same by the
law of the defendant's domicil at the time that the divorce was granted.
There are decisions to this effect."2 Certainly, there would seem to be nlo
justification for a court, which was not that of the domicil of the defendant, when the divorce was granted, to refuse to recognize the divorce
just because that was its attitude with respect to foreign decrees affecting its own citizens, if the defendant's domiciliary law at the time of the
divorce recognized the same as 'binding. If this were done, the court
would be enforcing its own domestic policy with respect to a foreign relation with which its policy had no legitimate or reasonable connection. 3
82. "Whether it [i. e. the foreign divorce decree] is valid depends upon the status
of the defendant when it occurred. If the state of which she was then a citizen recognizes such a decree... and gives it full force and effect then it is not for us to say that it
is void as to her." Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329, 332, 132 N. E. 106, Dean v.
Dean (1925) 241 N. Y. 249, 149 N. E. 844. See, also, People v. Shaw (1913) 259 III.
544, 102 N. E. 1031.
83. In Parker v. Parker (1915) 222 Fed. 186, A married B in California. Thereafter A deserted B in California, removing to Missouri, where he divorced B upon
constructive service. After this divorce, A married C in Iowa with whom he removed
to Texas where they established a domicil, raised a family of nine children, and accumulated a substantial fortune. Some thirty years after the Missouri divorce A
died, domiciled in Texas, leaving C and his children by C him surviving. B, who had
remained in California, brought an action in Texas, claiming to be the lawful widow
of A, and rights as such in A's estate. The Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor
of A, thereby determining that C was an adulteress and that the children, born to A
and C, were illegitimate, although such children were and always had been domiciled
citizens of Texas. The court did not consider the law of California in reaching its de-

JURISDICTION To DIVORCE

VI
Whenever a court takes the position that a foreign divorce decree
should not be recognized, the question may be asked, who is free to
question the validity of the same, and under what conditions may such
person question it?
It would seem, if the federal authorities do not recIuire the recognition of the decree, that the domiciliary state of the defendant, at the
time that the divorce was granted, could always question the decree's validity, and could, if either party remarried prosecute for bigamy. "' It
would seem also that, if the divorce was invalid according to the law of
defendant's domicil at that time, any other state (other than that which
rendered the decree) would be equally free to question the validity of
the divorce"'. However, if the divorce was valid according to the law of
the defendant's domicil at that time, it would seem upon principles heretofore discussed that no state should be in a position to question the
86
same.
It is usually held that a plaintiff, who has procured a divorce, may
not dispute its effectiveness; he is said to be "estopped". 8 1 From a practical point of view this is desirable. But is such estoppel consistent with
the proposition advanced by some courts that a foreign divorce, granted
upon grounds other than those allowed by the defendant's domiciliary
court at the time of the decree, is objectionable, unless accreditable under
the Constitution, because it violates its policies concerning the dissolution of the marriage relation? As already noted, 8 some courts hold
"cision, but contented itself with saying that the public policy of Texas denied
recognition to decrees rendered under the conditions that the Missouri decree was rendered.
In other words, the public policy of Texas required the court to bastardize citizens of
Texas. It is difficult to see what useful policy is subserved by such a decision. It
should be noted that the Circuit Court of Appeals assumed that A's divorce was valid
in Missouri, where rendered. 222 Fed. 1. c. 189.
84. Corvin v. Commonwealth (1921) 131 Va. 649, 108 S. E. 651. See, also,
People v. Baker (1879) 76 N. Y. 78, 32 Am Rep. 274; People v. Karlsioe (1896) 1 App.
Div. 571, 37 N. Y. Supp. 481. Compare State v. Schlachter (1861) 61 N. C. 520.
85. But see Parker v. Parker,supra,note 85. In that case there was no criminal
proceeding, but the federal Court, sitting in Texas, held that a Missouri divorce granted against a California citizen would not be valid in Texas to the detriment of innocent
citizens of Texas. Under such a holding it would be entirely possible to prosecute
either divorced party in Texas if he or she remarried and were living there.
86. People v. Shaw (1913) 259 Ill. 544, 102 N. E. 1031. See, also, Dean v. Dean
and Ball v. Cross, supra, note 84. Compare State v. Schlachter, supra, note 86.
87. Starbuck v. Starbuck (1903) 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193; People ex rd v.
Shrader (1905) 47 Misc. Rep. 333, 95 N. Y. Supp. 991. Compare Kelsey v. Kelsey
(1922) 204 App. Div. 116, 197 N. Y. Supp. 371.
88. In Grossman's Estate (1917) 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 367,372, (1919) 263 Pa. 139,
106 A. 86, a husband procured a divorce, which was not binding within the federal
authorities in Pennsylvania, and thereafter married again. It was held that his recognition of his second wife as such did not make his foreign divorce decree binding
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the view that marriages subject to a defendant's domiciliary court can
be dissolved only for grounds authorized by such jutisdiction's law.
Wherever this opinion prevails, it might well be said that, in the face
of such a policy, there is no room for an estoppel. That no one under
the guise of an estoppel should be permitted to nullify an existing marriage and the prevailing law of domestic relation.
When it comes to the defendant's attacking such a foreign decree,
this action should be permissible, at least in every case where he or she
has not by implication acquiesced in the decree.8 9 But suppose that the
defendant has remarried, can the decree then be repudiated and the
second marriage avoided? If the rule which discredits the divorce is one
for the protection of the defendant alone, an estoppel should be invoked
and the decree considered valid. But again the divorce may be discredited on grounds of policy. It may be that the divorce is considered invalid
because it violates the law of the defendant's domicil concerning marage. If this is the reason for discrediting the divorce, again, the position
might be taken that no one should be permitted to nullify a marriage,
which according to proper domiciliary law actually existed.90
JAMES LEWIS PARKS

University of Missouri
School of Law

the court rendering the same not having jurisdiction. Apparently in this case the
second wife was a Pennsylvania citizen.
89. In People v. Baker, supra, note 80, 76 N.Y. 78, it was the defendant mentioned in the foreign divorce decree, who was a citizen of New York, who remarried, and a
conviction for bigamy was sustained. But such a decision is justifiable on grounds of
public policy. In Kelsey v. Kelsey, (1922) 204 App. Div. 116, 197 N. Y. Supp. 371,
the defendant remarried and then sued his first wife, who had procured the foreign
divorce, for a divorce. It was held that the husband could not succeed in his action,
because by remarrying he had entered into an adulterous relation with his second
"wife." Such a holding does not render the foreign decree valid, it merely means
that the defendant is not in a position to raise the question of its validity.
90. The entire question of foreign divorce decrees is treated in notes to be found
in L. R. A. 1917B 1032; (1925) 39 A. L. R. 603; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 1405. Mr. George
H. Parmele, the author of these annotations, has done an admirable piece of research
work, and the writer is indebted to him in no small degree.

